Background: Ward closure is a method of controlling hospital-acquired infectious diseases outbreaks and is often coupled with other practices. However, the value and efficacy of ward closures remains uncertain. Purpose: To understand the current practices and perceptions with respect to ward closure for hospitalacquired infectious disease outbreaks in acute care hospital settings across Canada. Methods: A Web-based environmental scan survey was developed by a team of infection prevention and control (IPC) experts and distributed to 235 IPC professionals at acute care sites across Canada. Data were analyzed using a mixed-methods approach of descriptive statistics and thematic analysis. Results: A total of 110 completed responses showed that 70% of sites reported at least 1 outbreak during 2013, 44% of these sites reported the use of ward closure. Ward closure was considered an "appropriate," "sometimes appropriate," or "not appropriate" strategy to control outbreaks by 50%, 45%, and 5% of participants, respectively. System capacity issues and overall risk assessment were main factors influencing the decision to close hospital wards following an outbreak. Discussion: Results suggest the use of ward closure for containment of hospital-acquired infectious disease outbreaks in Canadian acute care health settings is mixed, with outbreak control methods varying. The successful implementation of ward closure was dependent on overall support for the IPC team within hospital administration.
There have been more than 2,322 infectious disease nosocomial outbreaks filed in the Worldwide Outbreak Database based on articles published since 1966, which indicates the frequent and continuous occurrence of outbreaks across the globe. 1 An infectious disease outbreak is defined as the occurrence of more cases than expected of an infectious disease in a given area or among a particular group of people over a particular duration of time. 2 Outbreaks occur frequently in hospitals and health care centers and pose a serious risk of colonization or illness to susceptible patients and health care staff. 3, 4 In an effort to control hospital-acquired infectious disease outbreaks, many measures may be used, sometimes in combination, and include enhanced hygiene, isolation of infected patients, cohorting of cases and staff, visitor restrictions, and ward closures. 3, 4 Hospitals providing acute care began publishing reports on the use of ward closure in an effort to control infections and communicable diseases more than 4 decades ago. 5 Although there is no standard definition of "ward closure" and its use varies considerably, it usually involves some restriction of new patient admissions in some manner and is usually coupled with a bundle of other infection control measures, such as enhanced environmental services, rigorous hand hygiene, and enhanced surveillance to control transmission. 6 During recent years, the value and efficacy of using ward closure to control hospital-acquired infection (HAI) outbreaks has been questioned because it is among the most expensive and disruptive infection prevention and control (IPC) measures that can be used. 4, [7] [8] [9] Total closures of a ward, assuming 25 patients or more housed on the ward, can have a major influence on beddays lost, cancellation of elective admissions, loss of capacity for emergency admissions with its attendant impacts on morbidity and mortality, and may be difficult to implement in health care facilities where lack of capacity is a problem, or in wards providing unique clinical services. 9 Ward closures have historically been employed to curtail spread (by restricting admission of new, susceptible hosts) and thereby shorten the overall duration of an outbreak. In addition, ethical concerns when new patients are knowingly admitted into an area known to be experiencing ongoing spread of an infectious agent may factor into decision making regarding ward closure. Recent studies comparing the efficiency of ward closures to other, less expensive and less disruptive outbreak methods suggest that ward closures may not be necessary, depending on the setting and the type of microbe associated with the outbreak. 9 This study was part of an effort to understand current evidence in the literature as well as practices on the use of ward closure across Canada in the event of an HAI outbreak, with the ultimate goal of informing the provincial policy on ward closure in Alberta. The first part of this work has been published as a systematic review. 10 The present work is a survey-based environmental scan that was designed to gain a better understanding of the current practices regarding the use of ward closure to control HAI outbreaks in acute care settings in Canada. The objective of the environmental scan was to determine the frequency of use of ward closure in different acute care hospital settings to control HAI outbreaks; determine the context, triggers, and conditions for the use of ward closure; and provide insight on the professional perspectives and rationale used by hospital administrators, IPC directors, and other infection preventionists (IPs) regarding whether and under what circumstances ward closure is an appropriate means of assisting or aiding in the control of HAI outbreaks.
METHODS

Environmental scan survey development
The team involved IPC experts who worked in a collaborative and consultative manner to develop the questions and structure of the survey that would be most appropriate in addressing the objectives of this study. Demographic characteristics-related questions were adopted from the Canadian Nosocomial Infection Surveillance Program survey, "Hospital Profile for 2013 Core Surveillance Projects Including Criteria for Stratifying Hospitals for Level of Patient Acuity".
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A fillable portable document format (PDF) version of the survey was developed, and subsequently reviewed and revised by contentexpert members of the study team to ensure content validity of the questions. The survey was piloted by sending the PDF via e-mail to a convenience sample of 10 IPs, resulting in further refinement of the survey questions. As a result of feedback to the PDF, the survey was converted to a more convenient online format using FluidSurveys (www.fluidsurveys.com). The refined survey was piloted a second time among noncontent experts to address technical and aesthetic issues before launch. The final survey can be found in Appendix 1.
Distribution
Participants were sent an e-mail on behalf of the principal investigator inviting them to complete the online survey through an attached link or by telephone (Appendix 2). The survey was initially distributed to 210 directors and/or key personnel from IPC units in acute care hospitals across Canada. These personnel were identified from contact lists obtained from the Canadian Nosocomial Infection Surveillance Program and investigators involved in the 2012 antibiotic-resistant organism (ARO) study conducted by the Provincial Infection Advisory Committee for the Ontario Agency for Health Protection and Promotion. During 2011-2012, the Canadian Institutes of Health Information cited a total of 736 hospitals in Canada. The contact list consisted of names, e-mail addresses, and affiliations. An online search then identified switchboard or office telephone numbers to be used for telephone reminders of the survey. The initial participants suggested 25 additional individuals who were contacted to fill out the online survey. When multiple individuals were identified for 1 hospital site, only 1 contact was asked to participate in the survey (ie, 1 contact per site).
Data collection
The survey was initially launched February 24, 2014, and data collection was completed March 14, 2014. Two days after initial e-mail messages were sent to participants, follow-up reminders were conducted by telephone.
Participants who were responsible for multiple health care centers were asked to respond to the survey for the center with the greatest number of beds. They were given the opportunity to identify other contacts who could complete the survey for the other health care centers. The referrals were then reviewed by the study team and contacted if they were affiliated with an acute care site for which a contact had not already been identified.
Data analysis
Responses from the surveys were exported into comma-separated values and Statistical Package for the Social Sciences version 20 (IBM-SPSS Inc, Armonk, NY) 2 formats from FluidSurveys.com and resulted in a combination of quantitative and qualitative data, which were analyzed separately. Quantitative analysis was conducted using descriptive statistics with SPSS software version 20.0. Qualitative responses were coded independently by 2 coders into thematic categories. Disagreements were resolved through discussion to achieve consensus within the team. The finalized categories were organized into tables, noting the frequency with which each occurred, and example quotes were provided. The tables were used in the writing process to provide insight on the quantitative findings. These categories were then analyzed qualitatively to provide insight on broader trends that arose in the collective dataset. These themes were then summarized and are further discussed in the text.
RESULTS
The environmental scan survey focused on contacting a broad spectrum of acute care hospitals that were identified through the Provincial Infection Advisory Committee for the Ontario Agency for Health Protection and Promotion datasets. The survey was initially e-mailed to a core list of 210 individuals. An additional 25 individuals were contacted as a result of referrals. We received a total of 150 responses with 119 completed surveys, resulting in an overall response rate of 64%. Nine completed surveys were excluded because they were duplicate responses from the same site. Therefore, 110 surveys were included in the analysis (N = 110), which represents 47% of the 235 facilities surveyed. The sampling and data collection process is summarized in Figure 1 .
Demographic characteristics
The geographic distribution of participants across provinces was roughly representative of that of the initial sample (51% Ontario, 12% Alberta, 7% British Columbia, 6% Manitoba, 5% Saskatchewan, 5% Quebec, 5% Nova Scotia, 3% Prince Edward Island, 3% New Brunswick, and 3% Newfoundland and Labrador). British Columbia was underrepresented compared with the initial core sample of 210 individuals (14%). This relatively low response rate in British Columbia may have been due to both a provincial holiday and spring break during the administration of the survey. However, the survey received a larger percentage of responses than expected from Alberta and Quebec compared with what might be expected based on the initial contact list (ie, if our responses were representative of the distribution of our initial sample, we would expect 8% and 1% of respondents from Alberta and Quebec, respectively).
Approximately one-third (32%) of respondents completed the survey for acute care sites with fewer than 150 beds, 15% for sites with 150-250 beds, 35% for sites with 251-500 beds, 15% for sites with 501-1,000 beds, and 3% for sites with more than 1,000 beds. The majority (82%) of respondents answered for hospitals with 500 or fewer beds. It was estimated that the responses represented all hospitals in Canada with more than 1,000 beds, approximately 68% of all hospitals with 500-1,000 beds, approximately 57% of all hospitals with 250-500 beds, and approximately 10% of all hospitals with fewer than 250 beds. These estimates are based on Canadian Institute of Health Information hospital statistics, which do not include hospitals in Quebec and Nunavut.
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Dealing with excess demand
More than three-quarters of sites (76%) reported using an overcapacity/full capacity protocol (OCP/FCP) only when dealing with excess inpatient demand, whereas 26% of hospitals reported using the protocol continuously (ie, every 1-7 days), and 37% reported using it frequently (ie, every 1-4 weeks). A diverse range of responses was provided as to what initiates OCP/FCP. Some responses from hospitals with 501-1000 beds said that their hospital or site triggered OCP/FCP at a certain threshold before capacity in the emergency department (ED) was reached, such as 50% or 95%. Other hospitals reported triggering the protocol when capacity was exceeded, such as 103% occupancy for a site with 251-500 beds and 110% occupancy for a site with fewer than 150 beds.
Other commonly specified triggers for initiating an overcapacity protocol during 2013 were when the number of ED inpatients (range, 2-15) exceeded the number of available hospital beds, along with an ED admission wait time of longer than 1-12 hours, depending on the hospital. OCP was also initiated when the ED was overwhelmed in terms of resources and unable to provide timely care. For example, 1 participant stated: "An overcapacity situation exists when the ED is stretched in terms of resources to provide safe patient care and 75% of stretchers are occupied by patients that are under observation or require further/ongoing assessment or 45% of stretchers are occupied by admitted patients." Another respondent said that OCP/FCP is initiated when "all inpatient beds, ED stretchers, and clinical decision unit beds are full and there are sameday admissions for surgery."
Outbreaks and current practices
Almost all respondents (96%; n = 105) reported having a standard procedure for dealing with HAI outbreaks at their site, and the vast majority (92%) followed provincial, national, or international guidelines for dealing with outbreaks. All sites used multiple strategies to manage outbreaks whether or not they had a standard procedure for dealing with outbreaks. The top-3 strategies employed were additional housekeeping and environmental services, enhanced surveillance, isolation, and use of personal protective equipment. The least common strategies were spatial separation, blocking beds, and cohorting (Fig 2) . Definitions for these outbreak control strategies were not provided in the survey because these interventions were not the primary focus of the survey, and participants were IPs who were expected to have a good working definition of these terms. While ward closure to some could mean cohorting for others, cohorting is considered to be a different measure than ward closure, and specifically refers to "the practice of grouping patients infected or colonized with the same infectious disease together to confine their care to one area and prevent contact with susceptible patients" according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 13 Of the 110 sites that were included in the environmental scan, 70% reported having had at least 1 outbreak during 2013. The most common type of HAI outbreaks were those involving AROs, which occurred at 56% of sites that experienced an outbreak. For each site, there was a mean of 2 outbreaks of each type described in the survey (ie, ARO, Clostridium difficile, respiratory viruses, and norovirus).
Ward closure
The majority of respondents (84%) indicated that the definition of "ward closure" used at their hospital or site was the same or similar to that which was provided in the survey (ie, closure of a ward, department, pod, section, bay, unit, or area within the unit that includes all of the following: no new patients are admitted to the area, overcapacity beds (if present) were closed, no transfers to other units within the health care facility or to other health care facilities are allowed unless required for ongoing care (eg, a patient on a medicine ward who deteriorates and requires intensive care will be transferred to an intensive care unit), and no transfer to longterm care. There were no restrictions on discharge home. Those who reported differences in the definition of ward closure used at their site (16%) reported that their site did not have restrictions on transfers and/or allowed patient discharge home with community support or back to long-term care. As 1 medium-sized hospital reported: "We try to avoid admission and transfers as much as possible [during an outbreak] but we are tight for beds many days." Some sites continued to admit patients to the unit but not to affected rooms. Some respondents also commented that visitors were restricted or not allowed during ward closures, which was not included in the definition.
Current use of ward closure
Approximately 44% of respondents (48 out of all 110 sites) reported that their site used ward closure as an HAI outbreak control strategy during 2013, and 15.5% of those individuals used closure of OCP beds as an initial strategy to control outbreaks before closure of the rest of the ward or unit. Almost one-third of these respondents (31%) said that they would not typically consider using ward closure for specific unit types, most commonly intensive care unit, but also coronary care unit and neonatal intensive care unit or intensive pediatric care unit.
We asked participants who did not report the use of ward closure for HAI outbreak control during 2013 if there were reasons why they did not use this strategy. In some cases, there were no outbreaks reported, and in other cases, the outbreaks were quickly contained with implementation of other infection control measures. In 1 case, there was a pseudo-outbreak due to problematic testing of patients. Some participants reported that their site or hospital was not able to use ward closure as an outbreak control measure without influencing the ability to care for acute patients due to capacity pressures. One respondent reported: "We do not close units, wards, pods, or any areas in acute care as we are always at [overcapacity] ."
Ward closure responses showed that 42% of all sites surveyed had an outbreak during 2013 and used ward or unit closure as a strategy, whereas 26% had an outbreak but did not use ward closure, 2% had outbreaks but were not sure whether ward closure was used or not, and the remaining 30% of sites did not report an outbreak (Table 1) . Most respondents (88%) who reported use of ward closure at their site indicated that this strategy was used 1-3 times during 2013. Furthermore, 2% of sites did not have an outbreak during 2013 despite reporting using ward or unit closure. The latter finding may have been reported in error, or ward closure may have been implemented for maintenance or cleaning purposes.
The most common types of outbreaks that prompted ward closure included respiratory virus and norovirus, followed by C difficile, ARO, and other outbreaks such as Serrratia, group A and B Streptococcus, and rotavirus (Fig 3) .
Use of ward closure was more frequent in hospitals with up to 500 beds, but decreased among larger hospitals. Among hospitals that used ward closure, 7% had fewer than 150 beds, 8% had 150-250 beds, 17% had 251-500 beds, 9% had 501-1,000 beds, and 2% had more than 1,000 beds. However, the percentage of sites that used ward closure within each category were 23%, 53%, 50%, 59%, and 67% from smallest to largest, respectively (eg, 2 out of 3 hospitals [67%] with 501-1,000 beds had used ward closure during the last year). Table 2 displays outbreak frequency, ward closure, and overcapacity protocol use by hospital size; that is, number of beds.
Perceptions of ward closure
Overall, the majority of respondents (75%) reported that ward closure would be a part of their outbreak management strategy in the future, but almost one-fifth (18%) of participants reported that they were unsure about this. Only 5% indicated that ward closure would not be part of their site's future outbreak management strategy. Specifically among the 48 participants who had reported using ward closure during the past year, 90% said that this strategy would also be a part of their outbreak management plan in the future. Even for sites that did not use ward closure during 2013, 64% of respondents stated that ward closure would be a part of their hospital's outbreak management plan in the future. Of the respondents, 50% believed ward closure to be an appropriate strategy for infection control in general and 45% believed ward closure to be an appropriate strategy for infection control under some circumstances. The common conditions for the use of ward closure indicated by participants are outlined in Table 3 .
In general, individual participants tended to state more advantages than disadvantages of ward closure. The most commonly mentioned themes are outlined in Tables 4 and 5 .
DISCUSSION
This environmental scan has provided valuable insights on the frequency, justifications, and professional opinions regarding the use of ward closure through the perspective of IPC directors and IPs across Canada. The topic area is relatively novel in that no other published work in Canada has examined the practice of ward closure in managing HAI outbreaks. The high response rate for this survey (64%) likely speaks to the relevance and importance of this issue to IPs. Standard outbreak control methods varied across Canada and even within provinces and territories, but all jurisdictions reported similar stressors associated with HAI outbreaks and the control measures employed. Although ward closure was reportedly used by fewer than half of respondents (44%) in 2013, the trends indicated 50% of respondents believed that ward closure was an appropriate strategy as an infection control measure in general and 45% under some circumstances across Canada.
Given that 70% of hospitals surveyed experienced outbreaks due to AROs, one may expect that most ward closures would be due to AROs; yet, our survey found that most ward closures were due to respiratory viruses and norovirus. It is likely that hospitals were able to avoid ward closure from AROs due to a number of factors. The first is that AROs may spread more slowly than a respiratory or gastrointestinal pathogen, allowing for more time for containment of transmission of the pathogen. The second is that due to the slower spread of AROs, it is more feasible to contain those outbreaks using strategies such as additional housekeeping and environmental services, enhanced surveillance, isolation, and use of personal protective equipment. If the aforementioned strategies failed at controlling the outbreak, then, depending on the jurisdiction, a risk-benefit assessment may be conducted and ward closure initiated.
The reported frequent or continuous use of OCP/FCP protocols by respondents reflects the broader issues of insufficient acute care capacity, inappropriate use of acute care beds, or gaps throughout the continuum of care within the Canadian health care system. OCP/ FCP was originally envisioned to be an infrequent occurrence to deal with true peak pressures.
14 The survey findings suggested that OCP/ FCP has become the new normal or standard for dealing with regular daily pressures at many Canadian hospitals. Some participants' comments implied or directly stated that capacity problems limit the use of optimal outbreak containment strategies.
The influence of OCP/FCP policies on the ability to successfully implement IPC measures deserves attention. Some participants commented that ward closure is not an option due to continuous demand for OCP/FCP because of patient volumes, suggesting that administrative and patient care demands take precedence over the use of ward closure. Some participants commented that ward closure is not an option due to continuous OCP/FCP issues. Comments such as this imply that in some hospitals, IPC decisions are sometimes driven primarily by logistic requirements. It is problematic when this assumption is adopted in decision-making frameworks, because risk assessment should first and foremost consider the influence on patient care and associated ethical considerations, such as the appropriateness of admitting new patients to an environment where transmissions is occurring. 15 The latter point is increasingly important as health care moves toward a more patient-centric paradigm. A systematic, multidisciplinary, and evidence-informed approach to decision making that involves all key hospital stakeholders may help to provide a more balanced evaluation when considering ward closure in the setting of HAI outbreaks.
Many respondents in this study indicated an awareness of the subtleties of IPC practice and risk assessment with respect to ward closure and explicitly stated the need for a case-by-case riskbenefit assessment. Ideally, the decisions to close a ward should consider all foreseeable risks and benefits of each approach. 16 An overall risk assessment is required, including the risk posed for patients already in the HAI outbreak zone, newly admitted patients to this area as well as leaving patients in an ED for prolonged periods of time, and admitting patients to units without specialized services or transferring patients to an outside facility.
Respondents highlighted that the success of ward closure as an infection control strategy not only depends on the other IPC strategies that are simultaneously employed, but also on the organizational culture and structures that tend to influence the choice and implementation of IPC measures. Whereas some respondents reported having a collaborative team approach for responding to for the patients waiting for beds in the emergency department, or having surgery canceled." "Impact to the community would also need to be weighed." Depending on nature and extent of the outbreak "Ward closure never happens automatically (with the exception of influenza and norovirus), but is typically implemented for all respiratory viruses, but only very occasionally with ward specific Clostridium difficile outbreaks." "Short duration outbreaks such as gastrointestinal illness can be controlled effectively with ward closure.
[However] antimicrobial-resistant organism transmission requires a lengthy process and therefore the systemic impact is considerable if wards are closed." If capacity allows "It would certainly be easier to manage an outbreak if it were possible to close the unit to admissions, continuing to allow for discharge and therefore decreasing the number of patients at risk on the unit and the workload for staff while increasing the ability to clean. However, given the capacity issues at present time this is not always possible." Table 4 Advantages of ward closure based on qualitative responses Theme Quotes
Timely outbreak control "The earlier you act, the more limited the outbreak."
Enhances patient, visitor, and staff safety "Decreases exposure to patients transferred or direct admitted to the restricted unit."
Focuses efforts on outbreak management "Although we do not like to close wards as it puts more pressure on the hospital and [brings] negative publicity, the advantage is that you really get help." Collaborative teamwork "Strong support from the executive leadership of the hospital to support whatever infection prevention and control services indicates is required." "The solutions are developed with input by the ward/unit/ hospital staff. As a result, the entire hospital/ward staff takes ownership for the solution to the problem [and] adherence to protocols tends to be higher." Education/ Awareness "Front-line staff and their managers often have not read the outbreak manual and are often unsure of definition and signs and symptoms to be aware of." (This indicates that there is a need for more education and awareness on the front lines of infection prevention and control.) outbreaks that includes stakeholders from all key areas of the hospital and its administration, other respondents emphasized that they had little or no support across their organization for the IPC team and its decisions regarding how best to manage outbreaks. Respondents who reported little support for ward closure indicated that this was primarily due to admission pressures and overcapacity. Specific factors contributing to lack of support for ward closure included the potential detrimental effect on patient flow and thereby overall patient care or safety, concern over poor outcomes for patients waiting for beds in the ED or having surgery, negative publicity for the hospital due to ward closure, and added pressure on staff when visitation is not allowed and families and friends are not there to help with patient needs. A study by Danial et al 17 on a prolonged norovirus outbreak highlights how collaboration from all staff groups can contribute to the framework to control outbreaks. The authors recommend the latter framework for handling future outbreaks.
These data also implicitly point to the importance of the broader support structures within the continuum of care that ultimately influence the far-reaching influence of ward closures. For example, homecare and alternative sites of care provision can help ensure that acute care hospitals do not become the default place for receiving care, and help to alleviate capacity pressures within acute care settings. Having strategies in place in nursing homes and other long-term facilities to manage patients discharged from outbreak units, in conjunction with public health, is also important to ensure optimal bed use and patient flow within the continuum of health care. The influence of these factors on the use of IPC strategies deserves future exploration.
Limitations
A limitation of this survey was the unequal representation of respondents across Canada, although the team worked with the bestquality contact information lists that were available at the time. A fully representative sample would require access to a list of all hospitals across Canada, which was not readily available at the time of this study. Instead, the team used already available highquality contact lists from the Canadian Nosocomial Infection Surveillance Program. This resulted in Quebec being slightly underrepresented in the survey, despite best efforts to increase response rate from that province, such as snowball sampling and offering the telephone questionnaire in French. Furthermore, the data collection period overlapped with spring holidays in British Columbia; therefore, although that province was adequately represented in the sample, it was slightly underrepresented in the findings. At the same time, Alberta was well represented in the sample and had an exceptional response rate, possibly due to the familiarity of Albertabased respondents with the investigators leading the study. These factors may have resulted in a selection bias and may limit the generalizability of the findings.
In addition to this, hospitals with fewer than 250 beds were underrepresented in this study. This may have resulted in an overestimation of the proportional use of ward closure in our sample, because this strategy tends to be more applicable in larger hospitals. Larger hospitals are more likely to experience outbreaks and often admit more complex patients with higher acuity of illness who may be more vulnerable to outbreaks. Another limitation was the short time period for collecting responses. The response rate may have improved slightly if the survey was administered over a longer period of time, although with diminishing returns.
Definitions for IPC terminologies vary across Canada, and ward closure is no exception. The survey found that closure of a ward means different things in different places. For example, in Alberta, restricting visitors was not part of the study definition of ward closure and is not typically implemented except under extreme circumstances, whereas some other hospitals restrict visitors as a routine part of the process of ward closure. There may also have been other, unrecognized differences in definitions (eg, cohorting) that could influence the findings. For example, partial ward closure to some could be interpreted as cohorting by others. This would influence the results because respondents were asked about both partial and complete ward closure. There may be also differences in the interpretation of the role of IPs and the duties and responsibilities associated with that role.
Although the definition of outbreak is fairly clear, there can be great reluctance to declare an outbreak for a variety of reasons, including negative public perception. Furthermore, making a decision that a threshold has been crossed from "increased activity" or "cluster" to "outbreak" can be ambiguous in practice, particularly where multiple stakeholders and guidelines are involved. This was reflected in some participants' remarks, and may have influenced the interpretation of the study question and completion of the survey. This ambiguity could also account for the 2% of responses where no outbreak was reported but ward closure was reported.
CONCLUSIONS
This environmental scan is a first to provide an understanding of current policies, practices, successes, and challenges associated with HAI outbreak control in acute care hospital settings across Canada and points to important gaps as IPs continue to explore strategies to effectively manage and control outbreaks. It is clear that multiple factors and contextual considerations influence the decision to close a ward or unit in hospitals of all different sizes and profiles. Public health guidelines, the nature and extent of the outbreak, the ability to deploy other IPC measures, patient flow, as well as other systemic factors all weigh into the decision.
These data are instrumental in identifying gaps in knowledge and practice, because more studies are needed to understand the disparities in perceptions of appropriateness for the use of actual ward closure. The broader question of who determines whether and when wards should be closed is also an important area of further scholarly work. It would be informative to survey senior hospital administrators about the use of ward closure, OCP/FCP, and how they weigh the various risks in decisions regarding OCP/FCP or ward closure, whether complete or partial. Finally, more studies are also needed to understand the actual influence of ward closures in containing outbreaks and whether ward closure is indeed more effective for certain types of outbreaks (eg, AROs vs respiratory or norovirus, and endemic vs epidemic settings).
APPENDIX 1.
Canada-wide survey of infection control practices [Intro Page]
Welcome!
The team at W21C Research and Innovation Centre (www.w21c.org) is collaborating with a number of infection prevention and control (IPC) investigators and practitioners across Alberta to conduct a review of practices with respect to the use of ward closure for containment of outbreaks in acute care settings. The work has been requested by Alberta Health Services (AHS) and involves a systematic review and a Canada-wide survey of current infection control practices in order to inform policy and practice. You are asked to participate in this survey because your name was provided as an IPC expert by our collaborators on this project. The survey will take you between 12-15 minutes and will remain open until March 12. The results will not be used to evaluate performance in any way. Your responses will be anonymized and will not have any ramifications on you or your institution. This survey is uniquely tied to your e-mail address, so please do not forward it. If you think this survey should be directed to someone else, please e-mail us at rmgerans@ucalgary.ca with the contact information for the appropriate individual. At the end of the survey, you will have an opportunity to download and review your responses. Please review your answers with the medical directors of your IPC department. You will be able to revise your answers for up to 2 days after submission. Please do not hesitate to contact Dr. John Conly (john.conly@albertahealthservices.ca) should you have any questions about the study. As part of our appreciation for your participation, we are offering to share the summary of the findings of this work and any subsequent publications with you. Now we will ask you a few questions specifically about the use of ward closure, in any context, as a measure to control the spread of infections at this site.
Our definition of "ward closure" (ie, closure of a ward, department, pod, section, bay, unit, or area within the unit) includes ALL of the following: No new patients are admitted to the area; Overcapacity beds (if present) are closed; No transfers to other units within the healthcare facility, or to other healthcare facilities are allowed unless required for ongoing care (eg, a patient on a medicine ward who deteriorates and requires intensive care will be transferred to an intensive care unit); no transfer to long-term care; There are no restrictions on discharge home.
15. Is the above definition of "ward closure" consistent with that which is used at the hospital/acute care site that you oversee? * 
